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Abstract 
Agricultural productivity in the Central Asian republics of the USSR stopped growing from the 
late 1970s and declined in the 1990s when the transition to the market occurred. As a result, most 
agricultural goods were uncompetitive on the both the domestic market and the world market, and 
the agricultural trade balance deteriorated as imports grew faster than exports. Although there have 
been a few success stories – cereals in Uzbekistan, meat production in Azerbaijan, oil seeds in 
Kazakhstan – the overall picture is not one of agriculture as the driving force of the region’s future 
growth. We argue, however, that the relative decline of agriculture is consistent with international 
experience. In ‘economic miracle’ countries, the share of agriculture fell faster than in other 
countries because the sector donated labour to the industrial sector, which was the engine of 
growth. The problem in Central Asia is not the slow growth of agricultural output, but the slow 
growth of productivity in agriculture, which fails to increase the competitiveness of agricultural 
products and leads to an inability of the rural population to move to more productive industrial 
activities.  
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1 This paper is part of research conducted for the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on scenarios of agricultural 
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Murad Nepesov from Turkmenistan, and Dauren Oshakbayev from Kazakhstan – for help with the data. The research 
assistance of Ekaterina Jarkov is also gratefully acknowledged.  
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Introduction 
It is important to recognise that no economic miracle in the last 100 years, anywhere in the world, 
has been based on either agricultural or service industries. In the 16-19th centuries there were cases 
of ‘Western offshoots’ – settlement colonies, like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US, 
which relied extensively on extractive industries and agriculture. Harold Innis, the Canadian 
economist, even developed the staples theory of economic development, explaining important 
stages of Canada’s economic development by shifts from one major export commodity to another 
– from furs to fish, to lumber, to wheat, to mined metals and coal. Even today, the US, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand remain important exporters of agricultural commodities.  
 
In the 20th century, after the industrial revolution in major Western countries, there were no cases 
of miracle-growth stories being associated with agricultural exports. On the contrary, spectacular 
failures of growth occurred in countries specialising in the export of agricultural produce. 
Argentina, a developed country at the turn of the 20th century (fig. 1), lost its rich country status 
and became a developing country. It remains to be proven, of course, whether this was related to 
Argentina’s agricultural specialisation or not, but the hard facts are that the successful catch-up 
development of other developing countries only began in the mid-20th century and was always 
associated with manufacturing exports, not with agricultural or resource exports. In fact, the only 
cases of successful catch-up – developing countries or territories becoming ‘developed’; Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong – came through an increasing of manufacturing 
exports. Later, other Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN) and China followed the same pattern. 
Only Botswana (diamonds) and Mauritius (sugar cane and fish products in addition to textiles) 
may be seen as exceptions to the rule.  
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Figure 1: Per capita PPP GDP in Argentina as a percentage of US per capita PPP GDP  
 
Source: Data from Maddison (2014); figure by present authors. 
 
The reduction of the share of agriculture in GDP and the growth of the share of industry during 
the industrialisation – and later, an increase of the share of services at the expense of both 
agriculture and industry – is an objective process (Chenery, 1960; Chenery and Taylor, 1968; 
Chenery and Syrquin, 1992). However, in fast-growing countries (e.g., China), the decline in the 
share of industry has been slower than in other countries. At the same time, it appears that the 
increase in the share of machinery and equipment in manufacturing output, as seen in China, 
usually accompanies rapid growth or even becomes the engine of growth. We do not know of any 
cases of rapid growth (‘economic miracles’), which are based on the accelerated growth of the 
service sector.  
 
The results of a recent ESCAP study (2016) suggest that the poverty headcount depends on the 
share of manufacturing in GDP (fig. 2). It predicts that an industry-oriented structural 
transformation, enhancing agricultural productivity through sustainable agriculture and making 
overall efficiency improvements through innovations, has the potential to lift an additional 71 
million people out of poverty, create 56 million additional jobs in South Asia, and boost GDP by 
15-30% by 2030.     
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Figure 2: Manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP and poverty headcount 
(percentage of the population) 
 
Source: Kumar, Hammill, Raihan, and Panda (2016); used with permission. 
 
Rodrik et al. (2016) consider two sources of productivity growth: growth within an industry and 
growth due to structural shifts, i.e., reallocations of resources to more productive industries. The 
role of agriculture in promoting successful catch-up development in a developing country may be 
not so much to ensure food security or to act as an engine for exports and growth, but to release 
the labour force to move to industry where productivity is much higher. If employment in 
agriculture were to decline, it would be easier to achieve productivity increases in agriculture itself, 
because, ceteris paribus, land-to-labour and capital-to-labour ratios would increase. 
  
Policymakers and scholars often see the role of agriculture as a sector that provides employment 
and livelihood for a significant part of the population. It employs one-third to one-half of the 
population in Central Asian countries. If the agricultural sector shrinks, people lose jobs and 
incomes and unemployment and poverty grow. However, the way to deal with the problem is not 
to slow down the reduction of employment in agriculture, but to facilitate the re-education and 
readjustment of the workforce released from agriculture, so that former rural labourers can find 
more productive employment in urban and rural industry. China’s rural Township and Village 
Enterprises are a case in point. They provided about 20% of total employment at the turn of the 
century, when rural employment was 50% of total employment: 20 p.p, in industry and 30 p.p.  in 
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agriculture. Unemployment and poverty should not be dealt with by promoting obsolete 
technology and backward sectors – for example, using spades (or even teaspoons, as the saying 
attributed to Milton Friedman goes) instead of excavation machinery – but by facilitating the 
reallocation of the workforce into sectors with higher productivity. Such an approach kills two 
birds with one stone: increasing productivity in agriculture through moving farmers into industry, 
where productivity is higher.  
 
In a similar vein, Rodrik (2012) describes two approaches to development – bottom-up and top-
down. The former focuses directly on the poor and on delivering services like education, health 
care, and microcredit to communities. This tradition's motto could be, ‘Development is 
accomplished one project at a time’. The other approach takes an economy-wide perspective. It 
emphasises broad reforms that affect the overall economic environment, and thus focuses on areas 
such as international trade, finance, macroeconomics, and governance.  
 
The first approach uses widely randomised controlled trials as an instrument towards formulating 
good policies – e.g., vaccinations, microcredit, additional teachers in schools, mosquitoes bed nets 
dipped in insecticide. These are considered small projects leading to big breakthroughs. But 
without reforms at the macro level it is often impossible to ensure the efficiency of micro projects 
(Reddy, 2013). If assistance provided for particular investment projects crowds out government or 
private investment, the macro impact of the assistance will be minimised.  
 
As Rodrik (2012) writes, “poverty is often best addressed not by helping the poor be better at what 
they already do, but by getting them to do something different”. This latter approach is exactly the 
one defended in this paper. Countries of the Global South can gain much more by moving people 
from agriculture to manufacturing industries and promoting export-oriented growth based on 
manufacturing products than by trying to preserve agricultural employment by protecting and 
subsidising agricultural production. Domestic policies and foreign assistance aimed at structural 
shifts away from agriculture and in favour of manufacturing would be more beneficial to catch-up 
development than a thousand small microcredit projects aimed at retaining agricultural 
employment.   
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The share of agriculture in GDP and employment 
In the resource-rich countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the reduction in the share 
of agriculture in GDP was quite sharp. In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, it fell from 27-30% in 1990-
92 to 5% in 2016; in Turkmenistan it fell from about 34% to about 10%. The reason may be the 
Dutch disease – the reallocation of capital and labour to resources from other industries, from 
agriculture in particular. But in non-resource-rich countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) 
the decline in the share of agriculture was less steep: from 30-40% in the early 1990s to 15-25% 
by 2015 (fig. 3).  
 
The decline in the share of agriculture in total employment was less pronounced than in other 
countries at the same level of development. The reason is the collapse of the industrial sector after 
the transition to the market and the transformational recession: the service sector, which usually 
absorbs the inflow of rural labourers to the cities, was not even able to cope with the ‘redundant’ 
workers released from industrial plants, let alone the inflows of migrants from rural areas. In 
Turkey, the share of agricultural employment went down from 46% in 1990 to 20% in 2016, 
whereas in the countries of Central Asia the decline was less pronounced and in Azerbaijan it did 
not happen at all (fig. 4). 
 
Figure 3: Share of agriculture value added in GDP (percentage) 
 
Source: Data from the World Development Indicators.  
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Figure 4:  Employment in agriculture as a percentage of total employment 
 
Source: Data from the World Development Indicators.  
 
As a result, agricultural productivity either declined or grew very slowly, much more slowly than 
in other industries of respective countries and in “economic miracle” countries (Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN, China).  
 
The international experience is that in fast growing, ‘economic miracle’ Asian economies 
(1) the share of agriculture in output fell very rapidly (by about 5% a year) and (2) the share of 
agriculture in employment fell at either the same pace or even faster. As table 1 shows, in South 
Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and Vietnam the share of agriculture in both output and employment 
declined in 1980-2010 at a rate of about 3% to 6% annually. To put it differently, agricultural 
productivity increased no less than productivity in the national economy on average. This was 
possible due to technical progress in agriculture, which enabled a release of employees from 
agriculture to other industries, and due to the ability of other industries to absorb these employees 
and utilise them no less productively than in agriculture.2 In other Asian economies – Thailand, 
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Philippines, India, Nepal, Pakistan – the declining share of 
                                                          
2 China is an exception due to its 3.5% annual decline in the share of agriculture in output and 1.9% decline in the 
share of agriculture in employment. From this point of view, Chinese development was less successful than that of 
Japan and South Korea.  
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agriculture in output proceeded at a much slower pace: 1% to 2% annually. The decline of the 
share of agriculture in employment also proceeded, on average, twice as slowly, suggesting that 
productivity growth in agriculture lagged behind productivity growth in the national economy.3  
In this respect, the performance of Central Asian countries in the 1990s – and consequently 
for the whole period of 1991-2017 – was unimpressive, but in the 2000s and 2010s labour 
productivity in agriculture began to grow in proportion to the national average in all countries 
except for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (tables 2 and 3).  
 
Table 1: Agricultural output and employment in Asia: Speed of reduction 
 
                                                          
3 Indonesia and Nepal, however, were a little more successful. 
Country  Period 
covered 
(OS-
Longest 
Availabl
e)  
OS Start; 
End (%) 
Speed of 
reduction 
OS (% per 
annum) 
Period 
Covered 
(same for 
OS and ES) 
OS Start; 
End (%) 
Speed of 
reduction 
OS (% per 
annum) 
ES 
Start; 
End 
(%) 
Speed of 
reduction 
ES (% per 
annum) 
Korea, Rep. of 1965-
2010 
39.4; 2.6 5.74 1980-2010 16.2; 2.6 5.73 34; 6.6 5.15 
Japan 1970-
2009 
6; 1.4 3.57 1980-2009 3.6; 1.4 3.10 10.4; 
3.7 
3.39 
Vietnam 1985-
2010 
40.2; 20.6 2.54 1996-2006 27.8; 20.4 2.77 70; 
51.7 
2.72 
Malaysia 1960-
2010 
34.3; 10.6 2.28 1980-2009 22.6; 9.5 2.85 37.2; 
13.5 
3.32 
Thailand 1960-
2010 
36.4; 12.4 2.09 1980-2009 23.2; 11.5 2.31 70.8; 
41.5 
1.76 
Indonesia 1960-
2010 
51.5; 15.3 2.35 1985-2010 23.2; 15.3 1.59 54.7; 
38.3 
1.36 
PRC 1961-
2010 
35.5; 10.1 2.48 1980-2008 30.2; 10.7 3.51 68.7; 
39.6 
1.88 
Bangladesh 1980-
2010 
31.6; 18.6 1.70 1984-2005 32.3; 20.1 2.13 58.8; 
48.1 
0.91 
India 1960-
2010 
42.8; 19 1.58 1994-2010 28.5; 19 2.36 61.9; 
51.1 
1.12 
Philippines 1960-
2010 
26.9; 12.3 1.52 1980-2009 25.1; 13.1 2.14 51.8; 
35.2 
1.28 
Nepal 1965-
2010 
65.5; 36.1 1.29 1991-2001 47.2; 37.6 2.05 81.2; 
65.7 
1.91 
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Notes: ES = stands for agriculture’s employment share; OS = stands for agriculture’s output share; 
PRC = People’s Republic of China 
Source: Reproduced with permission from Briones and Felipe’s (2013) calculations based on data 
from the World Development Indicators. 
 
Table 2:  Agricultural output and employment shares in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Speed of 
reduction,1991-2017 
 
 
Source: Data from the World Development Indicators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sri Lanka 1960-
2010 
31.7; 12.8 1.76 1981-2009 27.7; 12.7 2.65 45.9; 
32.6 
1.17 
Pakistan  1960-
2010 
46.2; 21.2 1.52 1980-2008 29.5; 20.3 1.28 52.7; 
44.7 
0.57 
 Agriculture Output share in GDP (%) Agriculture Employment share in Total 
employment 
Period 
covered 
Share at 
Start date  
Share at 
End date  
Speed of 
reduction 
(% per 
annum) 
Period 
covered 
Share at 
Start date  
Share 
at End 
date  
Speed of 
reduction 
(% per 
annum) 
Azerbaijan 1991-
2017 
30.48 5.63 6.45 1991-2017 36.96 37.40 -0.04 
Kazakhstan 1991-
2017 
 4.43 n/a 1991-2017 45.72 18.05 3.50 
Kyrgyzstan 1991-
2017 
35.26 12.33 3.97 1991-2017 39.07 26.69 1.42 
Tajikistan 1991-
2015 
36.09 21.94 2.01 1991-2017 45.58 51.62 -0.46 
Turkmenistan 1991-
2015 
32.20 9.30 5.09 1991-2017 22.78 8.24 3.84 
Uzbekistan  1991-
2017 
37.09 17.32 2.86 1991-2017 34.65 21.91 1.71 
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Table 3: Agricultural output and employment shares in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Speed of 
reduction, 2000-2017 
 Agriculture output share in GDP (%) Agriculture employment share in total 
employment 
Period 
covered 
Share at 
Start date  
Share at 
End date  
Speed of 
reduction 
(% per 
annum) 
Period 
covered 
Share at 
Start date  
Share at 
End date  
Speed of 
reduction 
(% per 
annum) 
Azerbaijan 2000-
2017 
16.09 5.63 6.00 2000-2017 41.42 37.40 0.57 
Kazakhsta
n 
2000-
2017 
8.11 4.43 3.42 2000-2017 36.12 18.05 3.93 
Kyrgyzstan 2000-
2017 
34.19 12.33 5.83 2000-2017 49.72 26.69 3.52 
Tajikistan 2000-
2015 
25.12 21.94 0.85 2000-2017 60.21 51.62 0.86 
Turkmenis
tan 
2000-
2015 
22.54 9.30 5.69 2000-2017 26.20 8.24 6.64 
Uzbekistan  2000-
2017 
30.06 17.32 3.11 2000-2017 39.81 21.91 3.37 
Source: Data from the World Development Indicators.  
 
 
 
Briones and Felipe’s (2013) economic projections do not envisage a considerable reduction in the 
share of agriculture in total employment and output (table 4).  
 
Table 4. Projections for the share of agriculture in total employment and output 
 Output share % Employment share % 
2010 2040 2010 2040 
Kyrgyzstan  20.7 19.1 34 33.2 
Tajikistan  21.3 19.8 55.5 53.9 
Uzbekistan 19.5 12.3 38.5 35.6 
 
Source: Data from Briones and Felipe (2013). 
 
These projections are very different from the actual reduction of the share of agriculture in 
employment and output in economic miracle countries and territories during their rapid growth 
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periods – Japan in the 1950s-70s; South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the 1960s-
80s; ASEAN countries in the 1970s-1990s; and China in the 1980s-2010s.  
 
Labour, capital, land, and total factor productivity (TFP)  
The share of agriculture in total value added and in total employment fell in all post-communist 
countries, but output share usually fell faster than employment share, so labour productivity either 
declined or grew more slowly than in other sectors.  In 1990-2016 in Turkey, for example, which 
did not go through a transition to the market and a transformational recession, agricultural output 
and GDP increased almost twofold in constant prices, but the share of agricultural value added in 
GDP decreased from 18% to 7%, and the share of agriculture in total employment fell from 47% 
to 20% (see the statistical appendix). This happened because agricultural output roughly doubled, 
whereas the number of employees in agriculture fell by about 50% – so agricultural productivity 
grew fourfold, but the share of agriculture in GDP fell because agricultural goods became half as 
expensive in comparison with other goods.  
 
But in Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan, labour productivity stopped growing from the late 
1970s, declined in the 1980s and 1990s, and has been recovering very slowly since then. As fig. 5 
and table 5 show, labour productivity in Central Asian countries grew much more slowly than in 
South Korea, Taiwan, and China in the 1960-2013 period, even following the transition to the 
market economy and transformational recession after 1995.  
 
Table 5: Labour productivity in agriculture (constant 2004-06 US dollars) 
Country/ 
Year 1965 
 
1975 
 
1980 1995 2013 
2013 as a percentage of 
1965 
China 366 396 491 860 2461 672 
Turkey 1664 2172 2546 2851 5414 325 
Azerbaijan 2589 3153 3316 1235 1735 67 
Kazakhstan 5302 6160 6093 4878 4363 82 
Kyrgyzstan 2367 2881 2815 1754 2759 117 
Tajikistan 1949 2371 2322 786 1223 63 
12 
 
Turkmenistan  2830 3022 2961 1981 2411 85 
Uzbekistan 2810 3239 3268 2025 4007 143 
USA 26243 37135 41242 58396 101739 388 
Korea 616 924 1153 3254 9496 1542 
Taiwan 1755 2756 3410 6731 10329 589 
France 8602 14490 19970 39742 84095 978 
Source: Author’s calculations based on FAO statistics. 
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Figure 5: Labour productivity in agriculture (output per employee in constant prices, 2005 
US dollars)
 
Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
 
It is not only that the absolute levels of labour productivity in Central Asia are way below those of 
fast growing East Asian countries and territories (Taiwan, South Korea, China) and lower than US 
levels by nearly two orders of magnitude (table 5), but in all Central Asian countries except Turkey 
and Uzbekistan, labour productivity in 2013 was lower than in the 1975-80 period (table 5, fig. 5). 
In fast growing Taiwan, South Korea, and China, labour productivity increased over about 50 years 
between six fold and fifteen fold; in Turkey, it grew at an average pace, rising threefold; whereas 
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in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan it fell, and in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
it increased by only 20% to 40% (fig. 6, table 5).  
 
Figure 6: Labour productivity in agriculture (constant US dollars of 2004-06) in 1965 and 
2013 
 
Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
 
Capital productivity increased in all former Soviet countries because investment into agriculture, 
which in the 1980s had accounted for up to one-third of all investment, fell to just a small 
percentage of total investment between the 1990s and the 2010s. However, the other side of the 
coin of high capital productivity was the degradation of capital stock and infrastructure. In 
Azerbaijan, for example, the volume of fixed capital stock decreased (fig. 7) because investment 
did not compensate for wear and tear and retirement of equipment. Only in 2005-2014, due to 
increased investment, was there no decrease in the number of machines.  
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Figure 7: Stock of main agricultural equipment, end of the year, units 
 
Source: Data from Obara and Valiyev (2017); figure by present authors. 
 
Land productivity, as measured by cereals yields, grew in all countries of Central Asia with the 
exception of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (fig. 8). Uzbekistan and Tajikistan experienced 
especially strong growth of yields. Uzbekistan carried out a conscious policy of replacing cotton 
with cereals. The production of cereals in Uzbekistan grew nearly fourfold in the 1993-2016 period 
(fig. 9); the country now imports only 20% of its consumed cereals and is aiming to achieve self-
sufficiency in grain. It was government policy to achieve self-sufficiency in food – successfully 
achieved in many areas – and to diversify agricultural output. This was predominantly carried out 
via state orders – less for cotton, more for cereals – so the production of cotton fell by 50% in 
comparison with the late 1980s and the output of cereals and vegetables rose significantly (Popov, 
2013).  
 
Total factor productivity increased in all Central Asian states over the last half a century (especially 
for Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan), even though these increases were less pronounced than in other 
countries (fig. 10). No country had total factor productivity growth comparable to China, Taiwan, 
South Korea; and only Kyrgyzstan could be compared to the US and Turkey, whereas other Central 
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Asian economies and Azerbaijan lagged behind with a less than 50% rise in total factor 
productivity for over 50 years.  
 
Figure 8:  Cereal yields in Central Asian countries and Arab countries (average), kg per 
hectare 
 
Source: Data from the World Development Indicators.  
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Figure 9: Cereal production in Central Asian countries, metric tons 
 
Source: Data from the World Development Indicators.  
 
 
Figure 10: Total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture, 1961 = 1004  
 
 
                                                          
4 Total factor productivity in agriculture based on the inputs of labor, land, livestock, machinery, fertilizer, and 
fodder.  
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Total factor productivity in agriculture index, 1966=100 
 
Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
 
The recent growth rates of total factor productivity in Central Asian countries are a reason for 
optimism though. Over the 2001-2013 period, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan 
had annual average growth rates of total factor productivity of 2% and more (fig. 11).  
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Figure 11: Total factor productivity annual average growth rates in the 1960s-2000s in 
Central Asia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and the US 
 
 
Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
 
Estimates of factor productivity from national statistics largely confirm this story. In all countries 
– with the exception of Uzbekistan – total factor productivity in agriculture was below the national 
average and its dynamics were not favourable (see the statistical appendix). 
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Exports, imports, and trade balance as a measure of competitiveness 
The importance of agricultural trade for the Central Asian region as a whole is low and has declined 
in recent decades. It fell from 3.1% of PPP GDP in 1995 to only 1.8% in 2013 (fig. 12): the ratio 
declined or remained at the same level after brisk ups and downs for every single country in the 
region (fig. 12).   
 
Figure 12: Agricultural trade as a percentage of PPP GDP in Central Asia 
 
 
Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
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The reduction of exports was more pronounced than the reduction of imports, so the trade balance 
for the region as a whole declined from over two billion US$ in 1995-97 to $0.5 billion in 2010-
13. Only for Turkey has the trade balance in agricultural goods improved, but for other countries 
it has either deteriorated or changed very little (fig. 13).  
  
For resource-rich countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, a decline in 
agricultural exports and an increase in imports was aided by the Dutch disease: an overvaluation 
of the exchange rate due to the increased production and export of hydrocarbons, leading to a loss 
of competitiveness and relative decline for all other industries. For other countries, poor 
competitiveness for agricultural goods was the result of low productivity growth in agriculture. 
Only Turkey was able to noticeably increase its trade surplus in agricultural trade (fig. 14). Central 
Asian countries’ trade in agricultural goods with the EU went from surplus in the early 2000s to a 
deficit of 0.3 billion in 2014-16 (fig. 15) 
 
Figure 13: Net agricultural exports of Central Asian countries in 1993-2013, thousands US$ 
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Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
 
Figure 14: Balance of trade in agricultural goods in Turkey, in thousands of US dollars 
 
Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
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Figure 15: EU agricultural trade with Central Asian countries, million $ 
 
Source: European Commission, DG Agriculture and Rural Development (2017); used with 
permission. 
 
 
Figure 16 presents the normalised trade balance (NTB) in six major agricultural goods for seven 
Central Asian countries.5 Turkey stands out with sharp fluctuations in its NTBs, but no clear cut 
trend. Turkey was a net exporter of fruits and vegetables, meat, and tobacco; and a net importer of 
textile fibres, oil seeds, and cereals. Other Central Asian countries were strong on exports of fruits 
and vegetables – with the exception of Kazakhstan – and textile fibre (i.e., cotton), with the 
exception of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan, with its huge steppes, was a net exporter 
of cereals and oil seeds. Most countries were net importers of cereals, oil seeds, meat, and tobacco 
although exceptions included Kazakhstan, as a net importer of meat, but not cereals and oil seeds; 
Tajikistan, which exported oil seeds; and Turkmenistan, which imported fruits and vegetables. 
 
                                                          
5 Normalized trade balance is the trade balance (export minus import) divided by the sum of export and import; i.e.,  
(X-M)/(X+M), where X is exports, and I is imports.  It ranges from -1 to +1. The higher it is, the more competitive 
the industry.  
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For our study, however, what is more important than the present situation are trends, and these 
trends are not encouraging. Most agricultural sectors lost competitiveness in domestic and 
international markets: NTBs for major agricultural goods groups deteriorated for Azerbaijan 
(tobacco and oil seeds), Kazakhstan (meat), Kyrgyzstan (meat, oil seeds, and tobacco), Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan (tobacco). Only Azerbaijan succeeded in improving its NTB in meat and only 
Uzbekistan succeeded in oil seeds, although this was only in the 2004-2011 period, and in the 
2012-13 period it deteriorated again.6  
 
Meat production was not competitive in the USSR, so the liberalisation of prices and opening up 
of previously closed economies resulted in a reduction of the cattle population and a decline in 
meat production. Tobacco production seems to have followed a similar path. But it is surprising 
that in Uzbekistan, which switched from cotton to vegetables and cereals, there was no increase in 
the competitiveness of the industries that received land, capital, and labour resources. On the other 
hand, the example of the reduction of the net trade deficit for meat products in Azerbaijan seems 
to be a success story that deserves close scrutiny.  
 
  
                                                          
6 Kazakhstan’s oil seed NTB deteriorated in the early 2000s, but recovered afterwards so oil seed may well be   a 
competitive industry. Oilseed production is currently estimated at US$ 411 million, or almost 4% of gross 
agricultural production. The sector has quadrupled in the past ten years and continues to grow (FAO Regional Office 
for Europe and Central Asia, 2017). 
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Figure 16: Normalised trade balance for six major food and agricultural products in 
Central Asian countries 
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Note: Values of exports and/or imports for some goods (cereal exports, oil seeds imports, total 
meat exports) for Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and for certain years are not 
available and not shown on the charts.  
Source: Data from FAOSTAT; figure by present authors. 
 
Conclusions 
The productivity of agriculture in the Central Asian republics of the USSR stopped improving 
from the late 1970s and declined in the 1990s when the transition to the market occurred. As a 
result, most agricultural goods were uncompetitive on the both domestic and world markets, and 
the trade balance for agricultural trade became negative as imports grew faster than exports. 
Whereas there were some success stories – cereals in Uzbekistan, meat production in Azerbaijan, 
oil seeds in Kazakhstan – overall, it does not look like agriculture will be a driving force of future 
growth in the region.  
 
However, this is not inconsistent with international experience. In economic miracle countries the 
share of agriculture fell faster than in other countries because it donated labour to the industrial 
sector, which was the engine of growth. The problem in Central Asia is not the slow growth of 
agricultural output, but the slow growth of productivity in agriculture, which does not allow the 
rural population to move to industrial activities.  
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The goal of industrial policy in Central Asia should be to support potentially competitive export-
oriented industrial enterprises and to facilitate the reallocation of labour and capital from less 
competitive agriculture to more competitive industry. Only promising agricultural industries, 
which are already showing high levels of competitiveness, should be supported; otherwise there 
would only be non-economic reasons to continue with agricultural subsidies.  
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Statistical Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Labour, capital and total factor productivity (national statistics) 
 
Uzbekistan 
In 2016, labour productivity in agriculture was just over 60% of the national average, but capital 
productivity was over five times (500%) the national average. Total factor productivity (TFP) 
computed with the simplest production function (without land, only with capital and labour) in 
agriculture was higher than in industry and in services (fig. 1A, table 1A). Uzbekistan was the only 
country of Central Asia for which TFP in agriculture was higher than in TFP for the whole 
economy.  
 
Figure 1A: Labour, capital and total factor productivity in agriculture as compared to other 
industries 
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Table 1A: Share of particular industries in GDP, investment, and output of Uzbekistan in 
2016 (percentage), and total factor productivity (TFP) as a percentage of the national 
average 
Industries Investment Employment GDP TFP 
Agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries 3.3 27.3 17.6 150.1 
Industry 37.9 13.5 25.65 125.7 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 4.9 11 10.5 131.9 
Transportation and 
storage 9 11.6 4.8 45.8 
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Other 44.9 36.6 41.45 104.4 
ALL 100 100 100 100 
 
TFP – total factor productivity - is computed as  
TFP = GDP/(KaLb), where K – is capital (proxied by investment), L – is labor (employment), 
a=0.4, b=0.6.   
Source: National Statistics of Uzbekistan (https://www.stat.uz/en/).  
 
 
Azerbaijan 
The pattern of comparative efficiency of particular industries in Azerbaijan is very different from 
Uzbekistan: agriculture is the least efficient of national industries, whereas the champions of 
efficiency are the FIRE sector (finance, insurance, and real estate), professional consulting, and 
mining (oil); see figure 2A and table 2A. This is most likely the consequence of the Dutch disease, 
when resource revenues are not used to boost productivity in non-oil sectors.  
 
However, Azerbaijan managed to improve its normalised trade balance in agricultural trade from 
the period of the 1990s – it is still worse than in 1994, but much better than in the second half of 
the 1990s (figure 13). And NTB in meat products has actually improved (fig. 16) – one of the few 
cases of an improved competitiveness indicator in a sub-industry of agriculture in the post-Soviet 
space.  
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Figure 2A: Total Factor Productivity in particular industries in Azerbaijan in 2016, national 
economy level = 100%, log scale 
 
Source: National Statistics of Azerbaijan (Vilayat Valiyev). 
 
Table 2A: Total Factor Productivity in particular industries in Azerbaijan in 2016, national 
economy level = 100%, 
Industry Output Employment Investment 
Labour 
productivity 
Capital 
productivity TFP 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 7.1 36.3 2.1 19.6 344.3 61.5 
Mining 24.2 0.8 54.4 3018.3 44.4 558.4 
Manufacturing  10.1 5.1 2.7 199.3 376.8 257.1 
Electricity, gas and 
steam production, 
distribution and 
supply 2.2 0.6 2.3 385.2 94.1 219.2 
1
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Water supply, waste 
treatment and 
disposal 0.3 0.6 3.7 48.1 8.4 24.0 
Construction 15.6 7.2 18.0 216.2 87.0 150.2 
Trade: repair of 
transport means 11.1 14.7 1.1 75.3 1020.0 213.6 
Transportation and 
storage 7.0 4.2 8.8 167.4 79.1 124.0 
Accommodation and 
food service activities 2.5 1.4 0.5 174.4 457.2 256.4 
Information and 
communication 1.8 1.3 1.3 142.2 144.6 143.2 
Financial and 
insurance activities 2.2 0.6 0.0 378.4 4806.5 1045.9 
Real estate activities 2.7 1.8 0.0 145.5 838371.8 4645.7 
Professional, 
scientific and 
technical activities 2.0 1.4 0.0 136.1 3962.7 524.2 
Administrative and 
support service 
activities 0.7 1.2 0.7 55.3 95.1 68.6 
Public administration 
and defense; social 
security 3.8 6.0 1.8 63.6 215.7 103.7 
Education 2.7 7.9 1.3 34.8 218.7 72.6 
Human health  and 
social work activities 2.0 3.9 0.8 50.1 237.2 93.3 
Arts, entertainment 
and recreation  0.9 1.6 0.4 55.9 206.9 94.3 
Other service 
activities 1.2 3.3 0.1 36.6 1204.6 148.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100 100 
Source: National Statistics of Azerbaijan (Vilayat Valiyev). 
 
But the story of Azerbaijani agriculture seems to be more complicated. Since 2007 and until 2012 
agriculture was obtaining a much increased share of national investment – up to 4% (fig. 3A); it 
later decreased to 2% in 2014-16, but was still higher than in 1998-2006, when it fluctuated around 
1% (fig. 3A). Before 2006, the TFP in agriculture (as measured with investment data) was way 
higher than in many other industries: in 2005, it was over 260% of the national average (table 3A).   
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Figure 3A: Share of agriculture, fisheries and forestry in total investment in Azerbaijan in 
1998-2016 (percentage) 
 
Source: National Statistics of Azerbaijan (Vilayat Valiyev). 
 
Table 3A: Share of agriculture in total output, employment and investment (percentage) and 
Total Factor Productivity in agriculture as a percentage of the national average in 2005 
Output  9.3 
Employment 38.7 
Investment 0.7 
TFP as a % of the national average 265.8 
 
Note: TFP – total factor productivity – is computed as  
TFP = GDP/(KaLb), where K – is capital (proxied by investment), L – is labor (employment), 
a=0.4, b=0.6.   
Source: National Statistics of Azerbaijan (Vilayat Valiyev). 
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Kazakhstan  
Kazakhstan has a similar story to Azerbaijan. The TPF in agriculture was probably high in the 
1990s, when the share of agriculture in total investment was low, but it had fallen by 2017 because 
the growth of investment outweighed the reduction in employment.  
 
 
Table 4A: Share of agriculture in total output, employment and investment (percentage) and 
Total Factor Productivity in agriculture as a percentage of the national average 
(Kazakhstan)  
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Share of 
agriculture in 
GDP, % 7.8 7.0 6.3 5.4 5.6 5.2 6.1 4.5 5.0 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.7 4.6 4.4 
Share of 
agriculture in 
employment, 
% 35.3 33.5 32.4 31.3 31.0 29.9 29.2 28.3 26.5 25.5 24.2 18.9 16.2 16.2 15.4 
Share of 
agriculture in 
total 
investment, % 1.9 2.6 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.3 3.3 4.0 
TFP as a % of 
national 
average 70.9 58.4 58.8 57.5 59.6 54.5 65.1 48.0 51.1 42.9 47.7 50.5 63.2 53.4 49.3 
 
Note: TFP – total factor productivity – is computed as  
TFP = GDP/(KaLb), where K – is capital (proxied by investment), L – is labor (employment), 
a=0.4, b=0.6.   
 
Source: National Statistics of Kazakhstan (provided by Dauren Oshakbayev).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Turkmenistan 
 
Table 5A: Share of agriculture in total output, employment and investment (percentage) and 
Total Factor Productivity in agriculture as a percentage of the national average in 
Turkmenistan  
 
Share of agriculture in  2000  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Output 23 19 13 13 15 13 
Employment  47.6 48.4 47.5 46.3 46.7 46.6 
Investment  8.8 6.7 4.1 3.2 2.9 2.2 
TFP as a % of national 
average 95.0 86.6 73.3 81.3 97.0 94.1 
 
Note: TFP – total factor productivity – is computed as  
TFP = GDP/(KaLb), where K – is capital (proxied by investment), L – is labor (employment), 
a=0.4, b=0.6.   
Source: National Statistics of Turkmenistan (provided by Murad Nepesov).   
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Appendix B. Share of agriculture in GDP and total employment 
 
Azerbaijan 
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Kazakhstan 
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Kyrgyzstan 
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Tajikistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Employment in agriculture (% of total
employment)
Unemployment, total (% of total labor
force) (national estimate)
44 
 
 
Turkey 
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Source: Data from the World Development Indicators. 
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